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Introduction
The manufacturing, processing, and use of chemicals, mate-
rials, tools, machinery, and equipment in industrial, construc-
tion, mining, and agricultural workplaces often cause
environmental, health, and safety hazards and risks. Occupa-
tional and environmental factors cause or exacerbate major
diseases of the respiratory, cardiovascular, reproductive, and
nervous systems and cause systemic poisoning and some
cancers and birth defects. Occupational and environmental
disease and injury place heavy economic and social burdens
on workers, employers, community residents, and taxpayers.
Because voluntary efforts in the unregulated market have
not proven sufﬁciently successful in reducing the incidence of
these diseases and injuries, the public has demanded govern-
ment intervention into the activities of the private sector. This
intervention takes the form of legislation aimed at reducing
or eliminating environmental health and safety hazards
through standard setting, information disclosure requirements,
and/or other governmental directives. This article addresses the
major regulatory systems (or regimes) designed to protect
public and worker health from chemicals discharged from
sources that pollute the air, water, ground, and/or workplace.
The establishment of standards and other legal requirements
in these regulatory regimes has occurred over a more than
40-year period that has seen changes in the use of scientiﬁc
and technical information in regulatory initiatives and in legal
doctrine, including the manner in which science, economics,
and technological capability are viewed by the courts. The
concepts of risk assessment, cost–beneﬁt analysis, and tech-
nology forcing have evolved, both through the development
of case law and through changes in the political environment.
Often, change in one of the regulatory regimes has affected the
other regulatory regimes as well. Finally, the focus and strin-
gency of all of these regulatory regimes have been inﬂuenced
by the participation of environmental groups, labor unions,
and the affected industries themselves; public input into the
setting (and, in many cases, the enforcement) of regulatory
standards is speciﬁcally encouraged by all of these statutes.
Standards can be classiﬁed in a number of ways. A perfor-
mance standard is one that speciﬁes a particular outcome –
such as a speciﬁed emission level above which it is illegal to
emit a speciﬁed air pollutant – but does not specify how that
outcome is to be achieved. A design or speciﬁcation standard,
on the other hand, speciﬁes a particular technology – such as
a catalytic converter – that must be used. In either case, the stan-
dard can be based on (1) a desired level of protection for
human health or environmental quality, (2) some level of
presumed technological feasibility, (3) some level of presumed
economic feasibility, or (4) some balancing of social costs and
social beneﬁts. Within each of these options, there is a wide
spectrum of possible approaches. A human health-based stan-
dard, for example, might choose to protect only the average
member of the population, or it might choose to protect the
most sensitive individual. A technology-based standard might
be based on what is deemed feasible for an entire industry,
or on what is deemed feasible for each ﬁrm within the industry.
Moreover, some standards might be based on a combination of
these factors. Many standards based on technological feasi-
bility, for example, are also based on some concept of
economic feasibility. Other regulatory controls include
(1) information-based obligations, such as the disclosure of
(and retention of, or provision of access to) exposure, toxicity,
chemical content, and production data and (2) requirements to
conduct testing or screening of chemical products.
In the United States, toxic substances in the industrial work-
place have been regulated primarily through the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHAct) of 1970 and the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA) of 1976. These federal laws
have remained essentially unchanged since their passage,
although serious attempts at reform have been made from
time to time. The evolution of regulatory law under the
OSHAct has profoundly inﬂuenced other environmental legis-
lation, including the regulation of air, water, and waste, but
especially the evolution of TSCA. Since 1990, sudden and acci-
dental releases of chemicals (chemical accidents), which may
affect both workers and community residents, have been regu-
lated under both the Clean Air Act and the OSHAct.
The OSHAct established the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) in the Department of Labor
to implement and enforce compliance with the act, the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) in the Department of Health and Human Services
(under the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) to
perform research and conduct health hazard evaluations, and
the independent, quasi-judicial Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission to hear employer contests of
OSHA citations. The Ofﬁce of Pollution Prevention and Toxic
Substances in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
administers TSCA. EPA’s Ofﬁce of Air, Water, and Solid Waste,
regulates media-based pollution generally, while the agency’s
Ofﬁce of Chemical Preparedness and Emergency Response is
responsible for the chemical safety provisions of the Clean
Air Act.
Increasingly, the health and environmental hazards associ-
ated with energy-related activities such as the emission of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) and the extraction of oil and gas
through hydraulic fracturing (fracking) are receiving regulatory
attention.
Standard Setting and Obligations of the Employer and
the Manufacturer or User of Toxic Substances
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
The OSHAct requires OSHA to (1) encourage employers and
employees to reduce hazards in the workplace and to implement
new or improved safety and health programs, (2) develop
mandatory job safety and health standards and enforce them
effectively, (3) establish “separate but dependent responsibilities
International Encyclopedia of Public Health, 2nd edition, Volume 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-803678-5.00136-3 507
and rights” for employers and employees for the achievement of
better safety and health conditions, (4) establish reporting and
record-keeping procedures to monitor job-related injuries and
illnesses, and (5) encourage states to assume the fullest respon-
sibility for establishing and administering their own occupa-
tional safety and health programs, which must be at least as
effective as the federal program.
OSHA can begin standard-setting procedures either on its
own or on petitions from other parties, including the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, NIOSH, state and local govern-
ments, any nationally recognized standards-producing organi-
zation, employer or labor representatives, or any other
interested person. The standard-setting process involves input
from advisory committees and from NIOSH. When OSHA
develops plans to propose, amend, or delete a standard, it
publishes these intentions in the Federal Register. Subsequently,
interested parties have opportunities to present arguments and
pertinent evidence in writing or at public hearings. Under
certain conditions, OSHA is authorized to set emergency
temporary standards, which take effect immediately, but which
are to be followed by the establishment of permanent stan-
dards within 6 months. To set an emergency temporary stan-
dard, OSHA must ﬁrst determine that workers are in grave
danger from exposure to toxic substances or new hazards and
are not adequately protected by existing standards. Both emer-
gency temporary and permanent standards can be appealed
through the federal courts, but ﬁling an appeals petition does
not delay the enforcement of the standard unless a court of
appeals speciﬁcally orders it. Employers may make application
to OSHA for a temporary variance from a standard or regula-
tion if they lack the means to comply readily with it, or for
a permanent variance if they can prove that their facilities or
methods of operation provide employee protection that is at
least as effective as that required by OSHA.
Key OSHA Standards
The OSHAct provides two general means of protection for
workers: (1) a general statutory duty to provide a safe and
healthful workplace and (2) promulgation of speciﬁc stan-
dards to which speciﬁed categories of employers must adhere.
The act imposes on virtually every employer in the private
sector a general duty “to furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death
or serious physical harm .” A recognized hazard may be
a substance for which the likelihood of harm has been the
subject of research, giving rise to reasonable suspicion, or
a substance for which an OSHA standard may or may not
have been promulgated. The burden of proving that a partic-
ular substance is a recognized hazard and that industrial expo-
sure to it results in a signiﬁcant degree of exposure is placed on
OSHA. Because standard setting is a slow process, protection
of workers through the employer’s general duty obligation
could be especially important, but it is crucially dependent
on the existence of reliable health effects data, as well as on
the willingness of a particular OSHA to use this as a vehicle
for protection.
The OSHAct speciﬁcally addresses the subject of toxic mate-
rials. It states, in Section 6(b)(5) of the act, that the Secretary of
Labor (through OSHA), in promulgating standards dealing
with toxic materials or harmful physical agents, shall set the
standard that “most adequately assures, to the extent feasible,
on the basis of the best available evidence that no employee
will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity, even if such employee has a regular exposure to the
hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his
working life.” These words indicate that the issue of exposure
to toxic chemicals or carcinogens that have long latency
periods, as well as to reproductive hazards, is covered by the
act in speciﬁc terms.
In 1971, under Section 6(a) of the act, which allowed for
their adoption without critical review, OSHA initially adopted
as standards the so-called permissible exposure limits (PELs):
450 threshold limit values (TLVs) recommended by the
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
(ACGIH) as guidelines for protection against the toxic effects
of these materials. Thereafter, in the 1970s, OSHA proceeded
to set updated standards for asbestos, vinyl chloride, arsenic,
dibromochloropropane, coke oven emissions, acrylonitrile,
lead, cotton dust, and a group of 14 carcinogens under Section
6(b). In the 1980s, OSHA set Section 6(b) standards for
benzene, ethylene oxide, and formaldehyde as carcinogens
and regulated asbestos more rigidly as a carcinogen at 0.2 ﬁber-
s cm3. In the early 1990s, OSHA regulated cadmium, blood-
borne pathogens, glycol ethers, and conﬁned spaces. OSHA
also lowered the PEL for formaldehyde from 1 to 0.75 parts
per million (ppm; averaged over an 8-h period) and issued
a process safety management (PSM) rule (see the discussion
in the section The Chemical Safety Provisions of the Clean
Air Act: Obligations Imposed by EPA and OSHA to Prevent
the Sudden and Accidental Releases of Chemicals). In 2013,
after decades of delay, OSHA proposed a new PEL of
50 mg m3 (averaged over an 8-h period) for silica dust, which
would replace the 1971 PEL and provide further protection
against silicosis, lung cancer, other respiratory diseases, and
kidney disease.
The burden of proving the hazardous nature of a substance
is placed on OSHA, as is the burden of proving that the
proposed controls are technologically feasible. The necessarily
slow and arduous task of setting standards, substance by
substance, makes it impossible for OSHA to deal realistically
with 13 000 toxic substances or approximately 250 suspect
carcinogens on NIOSH lists. Efforts were made to streamline
the process by (1) proposing generic standards for carcinogens
and (2) proposing a generic standard updating the TLVs (PELs).
Neither of these efforts was successful.
The inadequacy of the 450 TLVs adopted under Section 6(a)
of the act is widely known. The TLVs originated as guidelines
recommended by the ACGIH in 1969 to protect the average
worker from either recognized acute effects or easily recognized
chronic effects. The standards were based on animal toxicity
data or the limited epidemiologic evidence available at the
time. They do not address sensitive populations within the
workforce or those with prior exposure or existing disease;
nor do they address carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, or
teratogenicity.
An example of the inadequacy of protection offered by the
TLVs is the 1971 TLV for vinyl chloride, which was set
at 250 ppm, whereas the latter, more protective standard
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(see below) recommended no greater exposure than 1 ppm
(averaged over 8 h), a level still recognized as unsafe, but the
limit that the technology could detect. Another example is
the TLV for lead, which was established at 200 mg m3, whereas
the latter lead standard was established at 50 mg m3, also
recognizing that that level was not safe for all populations,
such as pregnant women or those with prior lead exposure.
In 1997, OSHA promulgated a new PEL for methylene chloride
of 25 ppm, replacing the prior TLV of 500 ppm. The ACGIH
updates its TLV list every 2 years. Although useful, an updated
list would have unclear legal signiﬁcance unless formally adop-
ted by OSHA. OSHA did try, unsuccessfully, to adopt an
updated and new list of PELs in its Air Contaminants Standard
in 1989 (see later discussion). However, OSHA continues to
maintain that it is intent on revising the list. The fact that the
ofﬁcial OSHA TLVs are more than 40 years out of date
compared with industry’s own voluntary consensus standards
is not welcomed, especially by the more modern ﬁrms in
industry.
Under Section 6(b) of the OSHAct, new health standards
dealing with toxic substances were to be established using the
mechanism of an open hearing and subject to review by the
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. The evolution of case law asso-
ciated with the handful of standards that OSHA promulgated
through this section of the OSHAct is worth considering in
detail. The courts addressed the difﬁcult issue of what is
adequate scientiﬁc information necessary to sustain the
requirement that the standards be supported by “substantial
evidence on the record as a whole.” The cases also addressed
the extent to which economic factors were permitted or
required to be considered in the setting of the standards, the
meaning of feasibility, OSHA’s technology-forcing authority,
the question of whether a cost–beneﬁt analysis was required
or permitted, and, ﬁnally, the extent of the jurisdiction of OSH-
Act in addressing different degrees of risk.
Emergency Temporary Standards
In Section 6(c), the OSHAct authorizes OSHA to set, on publi-
cation in the Federal Register and without recourse to a formal
hearing, emergency temporary (6-month) standards (ETSs)
for toxic exposures constituting a grave danger. Before OSHA
lowered its permanent standard for asbestos from 2.0 to
0.2 ﬁbers cm3, it attempted to protect workers by promulgat-
ing an ETS at 0.5 ﬁbers cm3. In 1984, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals denied OSHA the ETS, arguing that the cost involved
defeated the requirement that the ETS be necessary to protect
workers. Attempts by OSHA to establish an ETS for hexavalent
chromium likewise failed court review.
OSHA has issued nine emergency temporary standards
under the OSHAct. Standards for vinyl chloride, dibromo-
3-chloropropane (DBCP), and the ﬁrst ETS on asbestos were
not challenged in court and remained in effect until superseded
by permanent standards. An ETS for acrylonitrile survived court
challenge. ETSs on benzene, commercial diving, pesticides, 14
carcinogens, and asbestos were stayed or vacated by the courts.
Over the past two decades, OSHA has avoided setting ETSs
and instead has proceeded directly – but slowly – to establish-
ing permanent standards for toxic substances under Section
6(b). Thus, OSHA denied a 1993 request from Public Citizen
for a temporary emergency hexavalent chromium standard
but promised an advanced notice of rule making for 1995. After
a successful court challenge, the agency issued a proposed revi-
sion of its 8-h exposure limit in 2004, 9 years after it had prom-
ised action. The proposed revision lowered the standard to
1 mg m3 from the previous 33-year-old standard of
52 mg m3. However, in 2006 OSHA set a permanent standard
of 5 mg m3.
Short-Term Exposure Limits
Short-term exposures to higher levels of carcinogens are in
general considered more hazardous than longer exposures to
lower levels. OSHA issued a new standard for exposure to
ethylene oxide in 1984 but excluded a short-term exposure
limit (STEL) that had originally been prepared, in deference
to objections from the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget.
Ralph Nader’s Health Research Group sued the Secretary of
Labor in 1986 over OSHA’s continuing failure to issue the
STEL. In 1987, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals ordered OSHA to establish an STEL for ethylene oxide
by March 1988. OSHA complied by setting an STEL of 5 ppm
over a 15-min period.
The Air Contaminants Standard
It is obvious that the slow, arduous process of promulgating
individual health standards under Section 6(b)(5) of the OSH-
Act could never catch up with advances in scientiﬁc knowledge
concerning the toxicity of chemicals. The ACGIH has updated its
TLV list every 2 years, and although not as protective as workers
and their unions would have liked, the recent updated lists did
advance protection over the 1969 list that OSHA adopted into
law in 1971. In 1989, OSHA decided to update the original
list in a single rule-making effort through the 6(b) standard revi-
sion route. The agency issued more protective limits for 212
substances and established limits for 164 chemicals that were
previously unregulated. Neither industry nor labor was satisﬁed
with all of the standards. Industry, although giving general
support, objected to the stringency of some of the PELs. Labor
objected to their laxity, citing NIOSH recommendations not
adopted, and generally objected to the rush-it-through process.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the standard
in 1992, ruling that OSHA failed to establish that a signiﬁcant
risk of material health impairment existed for each regulated
substance (required by the benzene decision) and that the
new exposure limit for each substance was feasible for the
affected industry. OSHA decided not to appeal the decision
to what it perceived as a conservative Supreme Court. Thus,
the original and inadequate TLV list remains in effect, and
164 new substances remain unregulated. OSHA periodically
expresses its intent to update the list through new rule making,
but no new action has been forthcoming.
In the meantime, OSHA could argue that those 164
substances are recognized hazards and enforceable through
OSHA’s general duty clause, but OSHA administrations have
not been willing to emphasize this approach in the case of
the TLVs, although OSHA has used the general duty obligation
to force compliance with good ergonomic practices in nursing
homes. In 40 years, OSHA has issued only about a dozen
general duty citations for substances covered by the original
TLV list. Recently, OSHA’s reluctance to use the general duty
obligation in the case of the outdated TLVs was in part due
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to the many congressional attempts to pass legislation prohib-
iting such use.
The Toxic Substances Control Act
TSCA enables EPA to require data from industry on the
production, use, and health and environmental effects of
chemicals. TSCA also requires the manufacturer of new chem-
icals, or of existing chemicals put to a signiﬁcant new use, to
ﬁle a premarket notiﬁcation (PMN) with EPA. EPA may regu-
late chemicals under TSCA – by requiring labeling, setting
tolerances, or banning completely and requiring repurchase
or recall – where the chemicals present “an unreasonable
risk of injury to human health or the environment.” EPA
may also order a speciﬁc change in chemical process tech-
nology. In addition, TSCA gives aggrieved parties, including
consumers and workers, speciﬁc rights to sue to enforce under
the act, with the possibility of awards for attorneys’ fees,
a feature not found in the OSHAct.
Under TSCA, EPA must regulate “unreasonable risks of
injury to human health or the environment.” EPA has issued
a regulation for worker protection from asbestos that extends
the OSHA limit of 0.2 ﬁbers cm3 to state and local govern-
ment asbestos abatement workers not covered by OSHA.
Although the potential exists for broader regulation of work-
place chemicals under TSCA, EPA has not been aggressive in
this area. Between 1977 and 1990, of the 22 regulatory actions
under TSCA directed at existing chemicals, 15 addressed poly-
chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), which EPA has a speciﬁc statu-
tory directive to address under TSCA. Only regulations
pertaining to asbestos, hexavalent chromium, and metal-
working ﬂuids had a strong occupational exposure component.
Although EPA declared formaldehyde a probable carcinogen
and the International Agency for Research on Cancer classiﬁed it
as a conﬁrmed human carcinogen, EPA initially chose not to
take regulatory action on this substance, opting instead to defer
to OSHA workplace regulations. However, Congress ultimately
intervened, probably inﬂuenced by the government’s reluctance
to house Hurricane Katrina refugees in trailers containing form-
aldehyde particle-board. In 2010 President Obama signed the
Formaldehyde Standards for Composite-Wood Products Act,
which added a new Title VI to TSCA establishing limits for form-
aldehyde emissions from composite wood products, mirroring
standards previously established by the California Air Resources
Board for products sold, used, or manufactured for sale in Cal-
ifornia. EPA is expected to promulgate ﬁnal regulations under
these provisions that will minimize formaldehyde exposure
for both workers and the public.
EPA has also taken action to address hazards posed by
nanotechnology materials by requiring premarket notiﬁcation
for these materials under its Signiﬁcant New Use Rules.
Used together, the OSHAct and TSCA provide potentially
comprehensive and effective information-generation and
standard-setting authority to protect workers. In particular,
the information-generation activities under TSCA can be the
necessary data to have a substance qualify as a recognized
hazard that, even in the absence of speciﬁc OSHA standards,
must be controlled in some way by the employer to meet the
general duty obligation under the OSHAct to provide a safe
and healthful workplace.
The potentially powerful role of TSCA regulation was seri-
ously challenged by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
1991, when it overturned the omnibus asbestos phase-out
rule that EPA had issued in 1989. The court held that, under
TSCA, EPA should not have issued a ban without having ﬁrst
considered alternatives that would have been less burdensome
to industry. This would require the agency to perform a more
comprehensive, detailed, and resource-intensive analysis.
Rightly or wrongly, EPA has viewed this case (which was not
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court) as a signiﬁcant impedi-
ment to future TSCA regulations, and the agency generally
regards standard setting for chemicals other than PCBs to be
a nearly impossible task under TSCA for now.
There have been many (thus far unsuccessful) attempts by
Congress to reform TSCA since the asbestos decision. Nonethe-
less, TSCA continues to be important for its surviving authority
to require the testing of chemicals and for its information
reporting and retaining requirements. Since 2012 EPA has
turned its attention to (1) chemical assessments carried out under
TSCA by the National Toxicology Program and the Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (in CDC), and (2) prior-
itization of needed chemical controls based on those assessments,
in anticipation of revised or renewed regulatory authority
resulting from future successful congressional reauthorization
of TSCA. As of late 2016, only eight of 90 such assessments
had been completed. Both the House and the Senate have bills
currently in place to reform TSCA, but it remains to be seen
whether they will get congressional reauthorization, or whether
a ﬁnal bill will strengthen protection from toxic substances.
Control of Gradual Pollution in Air, Water, and Waste
The Clean Air Act
The modern Clean Air Act (CAA) came into being in 1970, and
although signiﬁcant changes were made in 1977 and 1990, the
basic structure of the act has remained the same, with the addi-
tion of provisions for authority over acid rain, chloroﬂuorocar-
bons (CFCs), indoor air, and chemical safety, the last of which is
discussed in the penultimate section of this article. The CAA
regulates both stationary and mobile sources of pollution,
taking into account the relative contributions of each to speciﬁc
air pollution problems, and the relative capacity of different
kinds of sources within each category to reduce their emissions.
The recognition that sources using newer technology might be
able to achieve greater emission reductions than older sources
with older technology led to the act’s distinction – both in the
stationary and mobile source provisions – between new and
existing sources. Driven by equity considerations regarding the
relative ﬁnancial and technical burdens of pollution reduction,
this approach unwittingly discouraged modernization or
replacement of facilities and resulted in the operation of older
(especially energy) facilities beyond their expected useful life.
For new sources within each industrial sector, there was a recog-
nition of the need for uniformity and also for encouraging tech-
nological innovation through technology-forcing inherent in
stringent standards. The court decisions recognizing EPA’s
technology-forcing authority were greatly inﬂuenced by OSHA’s
early technology-forcing approach to worker protection.
The 1970 CAA directed EPA to establish primary ambient
air quality standards for certain ‘criteria’ air pollutants
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(see Table 1). These primary standards were to protect public
health with “an adequate margin of safety” (see Section
109(b)(1)). As interpreted by the courts and supported by
congressional history, these standards were to be established
without consideration of economic or technological feasibility.
In addition, secondary ambient air quality standards for the
same pollutants were to be established to protect “the public
welfare . within a reasonable time” (see Section 109(b)(2)).
Both federal and state government were to be involved in
protecting the ambient air. While the ambient air quality
(concentration) standards for the criteria pollutants were to be
established by the federal government, these were to be attained
through (1) emission limitations placed on individual existing
polluters through permits issued by state government as a part
of their State Implementation Plans (SIPs) (Section 110); (2)
emission limitations for new sources, established not by the
states but rather by EPA as New Source Performance Standards
(Section 111); and (3) by a combination of federal and state
restrictions on mobile sources. In specifying compliance with
federal emission standards, Congress expressed concern
with possible hot spots of localized intense pollution and also
with intermittent versus continuous versus sudden and acci-
dental releases of harmful substances. Emission standards, in
contrast with ambient concentration standards, are expressed
as an emissions rate (milligrams emitted per 100 kg of product,
per hour, per day, per week, per quarter, per year, per BTU, per
passenger mile, or other unit of measurement).
The 1970 CAA also made a distinction between the control
of criteria pollutants through federal ambient air standards and
the control of hazardous air pollutants by means of federal
emission limitations. Hazardous air pollutants were those
recognized as extraordinarily toxic and eventually regarded as
non- or low-threshold pollutants. Initially, these were to be
regulated to protect public health with “an ample margin of
safety” (Section 112) and, as with the primary ambient stan-
dards for criteria pollutants, standards were to be established
without consideration of economic burden. These pollutants,
Congress determined, were sufﬁciently dangerous to preclude
any reliance on atmospheric dispersion and mixing as a means
of reducing their ambient concentrations. Because of their
extraordinary toxicity, ‘hot spots’ of these pollutants were to
be avoided, and because ambient standards were considered
impractical and of little relevance for sporadic and idiosyncratic
sources, uniform federal emission standards were considered
necessary. (Note, however, that California did establish an
ambient standard as a complement to the federal emission
limitation on vinyl chloride.)
In the early stages of the implementation of the stationary
source provisions of the Clean Air Act (approximately
1970–1975), EPA focused on (1) the primary and secondary
ambient air quality standards and (2) emission standards for
new sources of criteria pollutants and for all sources emitting
seven regulated hazardous air pollutants (discussed below).
Prior advisory standards for ﬁve criteria pollutants – carbon
monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO2), oxides of nitrogen
(NOX), large particulate matter, and photochemical oxidants
–were made mandatory. In 1979, the standard for photochem-
ical oxidants was narrowed to cover only ground-level ozone,
and the standard was relaxed from 0.08 to 0.12 ppm averaged
over a 1-h period. A revised standard for coarse particulate
matter (PM10) – ‘inhalable’ particulates up to 10 mm in diam-
eter – was adopted in 1987. In 1997, the ozone standard was
returned to 0.08 ppm. At the same time, the particulate stan-
dard was expanded to place more stringent requirements on
smaller (<2.5 mm) ‘respirable’ particles (PM2.5), with a 24-h
limit of 65 mg m3. In 2006, the limit was further lowered to
35 mg m3. In 2012, EPA further revised the PM2.5 standard
by setting an annual limit of 12 mg m3. (The 24-h ﬁne partic-
ulate standard was retained at 35 mg m3.) A standard for
a new criteria pollutant – airborne lead – was promulgated
in 1978. Current primary air quality standards set under
Section 109 are found in Table 1.
In Section 112, Congress directed the administrator to set
emission standards for hazardous air pollutants at a level that
protects public health “with an ample margin of safety.” It is
likely that this phraseology reﬂected an early assumption
that, though very dangerous, hazardous pollutants did exhibit
a ﬁnite threshold (a nonzero level of exposure below which no
Table 1 National ambient air quality standards
Carbon
monoxide
Primary (1970): 35 ppm averaged over 1 h and
9.0 ppm averaged over 8 h; neither to be exceeded
more than once per year
Secondary: None
Particulate mattera
PM10 Primary (1970): 150 mg m3 averaged over 24 h,
with no more than one expected exceedance per
calendar year; also, 50 mg m3 or less for the
expected annual arithmetic mean concentration
Secondary: Same as primary
PM2.5 Prior primary (1997): 65 mg m3 averaged over 24 h;
15 mg m3 annual maximum
Revised primary (2006): 35 mg m3 averaged over
24 h
Further revised primary (2012) 12 mg m3 annual
maximum
Ozone Prior primary (1979): 235 mg m3 (0.12 ppm)
averaged over 1 h, no more than one expected
exceedance per calendar year (multiple violations
in a day count as one violation). Revoked June
2005. Codiﬁed August 2005
Prior secondary: Same as primary
Revised primary and secondary (1997/2008):
0.075 ppm averaged over 8 h
Proposed new primary & secondary standards:
0.070 ppm (2015) averaged over 8 h
Nitrogen dioxide Primary (1970): 100 mg m3 (0.053 ppm) as an
annual arithmetic mean concentration
Secondary: Same as primary
Sulfur oxides Prior primary (1970): 365 mg m3 (0.14 ppm)
averaged over 24 h, not to be exceeded more than
once per year; 80 mg m3 (0.03 ppm) annual
arithmetic mean
Revised primary (2010): Hourly standard of 75 parts
per billion; prior daily and annual standards
revoked
Secondary: 1300 mg m3 averaged over a 3-h period,
not to be exceeded more than once per year
Lead Primary (1977): 1.5 mg m3 arithmetic average over
a calendar quarter
Secondary: Same as primary
aNote that PMxy below refers to particles equal or less than xy microns in diameter.
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harm would occur). As the 1970s progressed, however, there
was a growing recognition that this assumption might be
wrong, and that for many hazardous pollutants there was no
level of exposure (at least at levels within the limits of detec-
tion) below which one could conﬁdently predict that no harm-
ful or irreversible effects (especially cancer or birth defects)
would occur.
This presented an implementation challenge for EPA. Argu-
ably, given its mandate to protect public health “with an ample
margin of safety,” the agency was required to ban the emission
of several hazardous substances. This would, as a practical
matter, essentially ban the use of these substances in many
industries. Seeking to avoid this result, EPA adopted a policy
of setting Section 112 emission standards at the level that could
be achieved by technologically feasible technology. (This is the
approach then followed by OSHA in setting standards for expo-
sure to workplace chemicals. In the case of carcinogens, OSHA
considered no levels to be safe and established control require-
ments at the limit of technological feasibility.) Using this
approach, EPA set ﬁnite (nonzero) standards for arsenic,
asbestos, benzene, beryllium, coke oven emissions, mercury,
vinyl chloride, and radionuclides. The standard-setting process
was slow and had to be forced by litigation; it took 4–7 years to
establish a ﬁnal standard for each of these substances. Had EPA
continued to set standards for more substances, and had it used
the technological feasibility approach to spur the development
of cleaner technology, the environmental groups may well have
been content to allow the implementation of Section 112 to
proceed in this fashion. When the setting of new Section 112
standards all but stalled during the Reagan administration,
however, the National Resources Defense Council, an environ-
mental litigation group, was determined to press the issue in
court.
NRDC v. EPA, decided by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1987, placed new limitations on EPA’s
approach to regulating hazardous air pollutants by requiring
the EPA to determine an ‘acceptable’ (usually nonzero) risk
level prior to setting a hazardous air pollutant standard. In reac-
tion to this case and to revitalize the moribund standard-setting
process, Congress amended Section 112 in 1990 to use a two-
tiered approach: the use of technology-based standards
initially, with residual risks to be addressed (at a later date)
by health-based standards. In the 1990 CAA amendments,
Congress listed 189 other substances for which Maximum
Achievable Control Technology (MACT) technology-based
standards were to be set over 10 years for major sources
(deﬁned as those emitting more than 10 tons per year of any
single toxin or more than 25 tons combined). EPA was further
mandated to issue a new rule, ‘where appropriate,’ adding
pollutants “which present or may present.. a threat of adverse
human effects (including, but not limited to, substances which
are known to be or may be reasonably anticipated to be, carci-
nogenic, mutagenic, teratogenic, neurotoxic, which cause
reproductive dysfunction, or which are acutely or chronically
toxic) or adverse environmental effects whether through
ambient concentration, bioaccumulation, deposition or other-
wise.” In addition, for nonmajor (that is, so-called area) sour-
ces, restrictions may be less: Generally Achievable Control
Technology (GACT) or management practices. More stringent
requirements are allowed for all new sources. Emission
standards established under MACT must require “the
maximum degree of reduction (including a prohibition on
emissions, where achievable)” but must reﬂect “the cost of
achieving emissions reduction and any non-air and environ-
mental impact and energy requirements.” For pollutants with
a health threshold, EPA could alternatively consider regulating
an ample margin of safety in establishing emission levels,
essentially the original mandate of the 1970 CAA. Finally,
EPA was obligated to issue a report on risk, which it did in
2004. If no new legislation recommended by that report is
enacted within 8 years, EPA must issue such additional regula-
tions as are necessary to protect public health with an ample
margin of safety – in general – and, speciﬁcally for carcinogens,
protect against lifetime risks of one-in-a-million or more. EPA
did make substantial progress on establishing MACT and
GACT standards but has just begun working on risk- or
health-based approaches. In Michigan v. EPA, a 5-to-4 decision
from 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a provision of
Section 112 directing EPA to regulate certain hazardous emis-
sions from electrical utilities when “appropriate and necessary”
requires the agency to formally consider the cost of compliance
before it decides whether to regulate. Although the EPA rule in
question, governing mercury emissions from power plants, is
being re-promulgated, the Court’s suggestion that term “appro-
priate” implicitly requires a consideration of costs could have
much broader application.
Perhaps the most contentious issue to arise under the CAA
since the turn of the century has been the regulation of carbon
dioxide (CO2) and other ‘green house gases’ (GHGs). After EPA
took the position that CO2 is not an ‘air pollutant’ within the
meaning of the CAA, a coalition of states and environmental
groups took to the courts to compel the agency to regulate
the chemical. In Massachusetts v. EPA, decided in 2007,
a closely-divided U.S. Supreme Court ruled that CO2 meets
the CAA’s deﬁnition of pollutant, and ordered EPA to deter-
mine, under the act’s mobile source provisions, whether CO2
emissions ‘endanger’ public health or welfare (see Section
202(a)(1)). In 2009, EPA made a formal ﬁnding that GHC
emissions from motor vehicles pose an endangerment to
public health and welfare by contributing to global warming,
and the agency subsequently set tailpipe GHG emission stan-
dards for cars and light duty trucks. The endangerment ﬁnding
also triggered a requirement that GHG emissions from major
stationary facilities be subject to technology-based limits (see
Section 165(a)(4)), and EPA imposed a set of limits that began
to take effect in 2011. These GHG regulations, which thus far
have been largely upheld by the courts, extend to six
substances, which are measured in carbon dioxide-equivalent
(CO2e) units for regulatory purposes. The U.S. Supreme Court
dealt EPA at least a temporary setback in 2016, however, when
it stayed EPA’s Clean Power Plan (governing GHG emissions
from power plants) to allow legal challenges to the rule to
make their way through the lower courts.
Water Legislation
The twomost important federal statutes regulating water pollu-
tion are the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA). The CWA regulates the discharge of pollut-
ants into navigable surface waters (and into smaller waterways
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and wetlands that are hydrologically connected to navigable
waters), and the SDWA regulates the level of contaminants in
public drinking water supplies.
The Clean Water Act
Themodern CleanWater Act has its origins in the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. The basic struc-
ture of the act was established at that time, although it was
reﬁned and refocused by the Clean Water Act Amendments
of 1977 (from which it also took its name) and by the Water
Quality Act Amendments of 1987. The regulatory focus of the
CWA is the discharge of pollutants to surface waters from ‘point
sources,’ principally industrial facilities and municipal sewage
treatment plants (known under the act as publicly owned treat-
ment works, or POTWs). The CWA ﬂatly prohibits any
discharge of a pollutant from a point source to surface waters
unless it is done in conformance with the requirements of
the act, and the statute has since 1972 retained as an explicit
‘national goal’ the elimination of all point-source discharges
to surface waters by 1985. Although the ‘no discharge’ goal
may never be attainable in practical terms, it has helped focus
the act’s implementation on gradual – but inexorable – pollu-
tion reduction, as discharge limits are made more stringent
over time.
The centerpiece of this pollution reduction scheme is the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit. In theory, all point sources must have an NPDES permit
before discharging pollutants to surface waters. In practice,
however, many dischargers (mostly smaller ones) still do not.
The NPDES permit, which is issued after public notice and an
opportunity for comment, is to incorporate all of the various
requirements of the act – including discharge limits – that are
applicable to the point source in question. Point sources are
subject both to technology-based and water quality–based
limits and to the more stringent of the two when they overlap.
The technology-based limits are established by EPA as
national standards. To set these standards for industrial
dischargers, EPA ﬁrst divided industry into various industry
categories and then established efﬂuent limits for each category
based on its assessment of what was technologically and
economically feasible for the point sources within that cate-
gory. Further, as required by the act, EPA set different standards
within each industrial category for conventional pollutants
(biochemical oxygen demand, fecal coliform, oil and grease,
pH, and total suspended solids), toxic pollutants (currently
a list of 129 designated chemical compounds), and noncon-
ventional pollutants (which simply are other pollutants, such
as total phenols, which are listed neither under the conven-
tional nor the toxic designation).
In recognition of the fact that conventional pollutants
usually are amenable to treatment by the types of pollution
control equipment that has long been in use at conventional
sewage treatment facilities, the standards for conventional
pollutants are set according to what can be obtained through
the use of the Best Conventional Pollution Control Technology
(BCT), taking into account the reasonableness of the cost. The
standards for toxic and nonconventional pollutants, on the
other hand, are set according to EPA’s determination of
the level of pollution reduction that can be achieved through
the application of the Best Available Technology Economically
Achievable (BAT). Originally, Congress had directed EPA to set
health-based standards for toxic pollutants, on a pollutant-
by-pollutant basis, but this resulted in only a handful of stan-
dards (mostly for pesticide chemicals). The political difﬁculty
of establishing national health-based standards for toxic chem-
icals led environmental groups, in a suit against EPA to compel
regulation, to agree to a schedule for setting technology-based
standards for a list of 129 designated toxic pollutants. Congress
formally endorsed this approach in 1977 by amending the act
to require EPA to set BAT standards for all of the toxic pollut-
ants on that list.
Under the CWA, EPA is to consider both control and process
technology in setting BAT standards, which are to “result in
reasonable further progress toward the national goal of elimi-
nating the discharge of all pollutants” and are to require “the
elimination of discharges of all pollutants [where] such elimi-
nation is technologically and economically achievable.” An
individual discharger may obtain a cost waiver from BAT stan-
dards for nonconventional pollutants if it cannot afford to
comply, but no cost waiver is available from the standards
for toxic pollutants. For new industrial sources within an
industry category, EPA is to set standards based on Best Avail-
able Demonstrated Technology (BADT), which can be more
stringent than BAT or BCT because of the greater technological
ﬂexibility inherent in the design and construction of a new
facility. Although industry-wide costs are to be considered by
EPA in establishing BADT standards, no waivers are available
to individual applicants once the standards are set.
The CWA also imposes technology-based standards on
POTWs, based on the limitations that can be met through the
application of secondary sewage treatment technology. In
essence, this requires an 85% reduction in biochemical oxygen
demand and total suspended solids. In addition, the act
imposes limitations on discharges by industrial sources into
POTWs. Such discharges are known under the act as indirect
discharges (because the pollutants are not discharged directly
to surface waters but rather are discharged indirectly to surface
waters through a public sewer system). Limitations on indirect
discharges are known under the act as pretreatment standards,
because they have the effect of requiring the indirect discharger
to treat its wastewater before discharging it to the POTW for
further treatment. EPA has set national technology-based limi-
tations (known as the categorical pretreatment standards) on
indirect discharges of toxic pollutants by ﬁrms in certain indus-
trial categories. In addition, the act requires the POTW to set
such additional pretreatment limits and requirements as is
necessary both to ensure the integrity of the sewage treatment
process and to prevent the indirectly discharged pollutants
from passing through the sewer system and causing a violation
of the POTW’s discharge permit.
For the ﬁrst 15–20 years of the act’s implementation, the
primary focus was the establishment and implementation of
the technology-based limits discussed above. More recently,
however, considerably more attention has been given to the
act’s system of water quality–based limits, which is equally
applicable to industrial sources and POTWs. Since 1972, the
CWA has directed the states to establish, and periodically
revise, ambient (in-stream) water quality standards for all of
the lakes, rivers, streams, bays, and other waterways within
their borders and has required EPA to set and revise these
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standards to the extent that a state declines to do so. Further,
the act has required since 1977 that NPDES permits include
such additional discharge limits – beyond the national
technology-based limits – as may be necessary to meet the
ambient water quality standards of the waterway in question.
To help call attention to these water quality requirements,
Congress in 1987 added what became known as the toxic hot
spot provision of the CWA, which directed EPA and the states
to identify those waters that were in violation of ambient water
quality standards because of toxic pollution, to identify those
point sources whose discharges of toxic pollutants were
contributing to those violations, and to develop an ‘individual
control strategy’ for that source (which almost always meant
a revision of the source’s NPDES permit to add or tighten
limits on toxic pollutants). Another provision of the act that
has prompted the addition or tightening of water quality–
based discharge limits has been the requirement that the states
(and, if they decline, the EPA) to calculate a total maximum
daily load (TMDL) for all waters that are in violation of
ambient water quality standards. For any particular body of
water, the TMDL for a particular pollutant is the total amount
of that pollutant that may be discharged to the water body in
a day without violating the relevant ambient water quality
standard. When a TMDL is set, it often leads inexorably to
a tightening of the NPDES permits of those point sources
whose discharges are contributing to the particular violation
of water quality standards. Although the TMDL requirement
has been in the act since 1972, the states and EPA were slow
to implement it. Over the past 20 years or so, however, as
a result of several successful suits by environmental groups
seeking to compel EPA to set TMDLs in the face of state inac-
tion, the TMDL requirement has come considerably more to
the fore. Consequently, the inclusion of water quality–based
limits in NPDES permits has become considerably more
commonplace.
By its terms, the CWA extends to point sources discharges to
‘navigable’ waters. Initially, EPA took an expansive view of this
language, using it to address point source discharges of pollut-
ants or ﬁll material to wetlands and isolated waterways as well
as to more traditionally navigable waters. However, in a series
of decisions culminating in Rapanos v. U.S. (2006), the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the agency exceeded its statu-
tory authority. In response, EPA issued a regulation in 2015
indicating its intent to apply the act to wetlands and isolated
or seasonal waterways only where they have a hydrological
connection to larger waterways. But even this revised deﬁnition
has met stiff opposition from industry groups, and the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals has issued an order staying the rule
as it considers arguments on the rule’s validity. Thus, a further
narrowing of the Act’s jurisdictional scope is possible.
The Safe Drinking Water Act
Although some sources of drinking water are also regulated as
surface waters under the CWA, the legislation speciﬁcally
designed to protect the safety of the drinking water delivered
to the public from public water systems is the SDWA. Passed
in 1974 after a series of well-publicized stories about the
number of potential carcinogens in the Mississippi River water
used as drinking water by the City of New Orleans, it contains
very little that is designed to address the sources of drinking
water pollution. Instead, the SDWA directs EPA to set national
health-based goals – known as maximum contaminant level
goals (MCL goals) – for various drinking water contaminants
and to set MCLs that are as close to the MCL goals as is techno-
logically and economically feasible. All public water systems,
deﬁned as those with at least 15 service connections or that
serve at least 25 people, are required to meet the MCLs.
Over the act’s ﬁrst 8 years, EPA set only 23 federal drinking
water standards. Dissatisﬁed with the pace of implementation,
Congress amended the act in 1986 to spur the agency into
action. It directed EPA to set standards (MCLs and MCL goals)
for 83 speciﬁed contaminants within 3 years and to set stan-
dards for 25 additional contaminants every 3 years thereafter.
Ten years later, with scores of MCLs and MCL goals now on
the books, Congress scaled back. In a 1996 compromise
endorsed by environmental groups and water suppliers alike,
Congress eliminated the requirement for 25 new standards
every 3 years. At the same time, it added provisions that effec-
tively ensured both that the standards that had been set would
largely be allowed to remain in place and that new standards
would be far slower in coming (and likely would be – because
of the addition of a cost–beneﬁt requirement – relatively
weaker).
Since then, the primary focus of the SDWA program has
been bringing public water systems throughout the country
into compliance with the existing standards. Although the
MCLs are set at a level deemed to be technologically and
economically feasible, many water systems have had difﬁculty
affording the cost of meeting, andmonitoring for, theMCLs. To
attempt to ameliorate the ﬁnancial burden on municipal water
systems, the SDWA has periodically made federal funds avail-
able for technology upgrades and infrastructure improvements.
The task, however, remains a daunting one. In 2002, EPA esti-
mated that approximately $151 billion would be needed over
the next 20 years to upgrade the nation’s 55 000 community
water systems.
The Regulation of Hazardous Waste
Broadly speaking, the generation, handling, and disposal of
hazardous wastes are regulated by the interaction of two federal
statutes. The primary federal law regulating hazardous wastes is
ofﬁcially known as the Solid Waste Disposal Act. In 1970,
Congress amended that statute with the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the law has come to be popu-
larly known by that name. RCRA was given regulatory teeth
with a set of 1976 amendments under which EPA, in 1980,
promulgated regulations establishing a cradle-to-grave system
for hazardous wastes that tracks the generation, transportation,
and disposal of such wastes and establishes standards for their
disposal. Initially, however, EPA’s disposal standards were
minimal to nonexistent and did little to discourage the landﬁll-
ing of chemical wastes. This led Congress, in 1984, to pass
sweeping amendments to RCRA that (1) established a clear
federal policy against the landﬁlling of hazardous wastes unless
they have ﬁrst been treated to reduce their toxicity and (2) gave
EPA a speciﬁc timetable by which it had to either set treatment
standards for various categories of waste or ban the landﬁlling
of such waste altogether. Consequently, EPA has set treatment
standards – which are commonly known as the land disposal
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restrictions (LDRs) – for hundreds of types of hazardous
wastes. These standards are based on EPA’s assessment of the
Best Demonstrated Available Technology for treating the waste
in question.
Thus, RCRA directly regulates the handling and disposal of
hazardous wastes. And by establishing a set of requirements
that must be followed once hazardous waste is generated, it
also indirectly regulates the generation of hazardous wastes.
RCRA regulations have increased the cost of disposing of
most types of waste by two orders of magnitude over the past
25 years. In this sense, RCRA operates as a de facto tax on the
generation of hazardous waste.
RCRA does not extend full regulatory coverage to all harm-
ful industrial wastes. For example, a range of oil and gas explo-
ration and production wastes are exempted from regulation as
hazardous waste. This includes not only an explicit listing of
certain materials such as produced water, drilling ﬂuids, drill
cuttings, and rigwash, but also “other wastes associated with
the exploration, development or production of crude oil or
natural gas” (see Section 3001(b)(2)(A)). This serves to exclude
many wastes from hydraulic fracturing (commonly known as
fracking) operations seeking to extract underground quantities
of natural gas or oil. Such wastes are still subject to RCRA regu-
lation under the less comprehensive provisions applicable to
solid wastes, however. Moreover, the disposal of such wastes
in subsurface storage wells is – as well as the use of diesel in
the fracking process – is subject to regulation under an under-
ground injection control program administered by EPA under
the Safe Drinking Water Act.
Another issue that has long been a point of contention
between industry and environmental groups is the status of
coal ash under RCRA. After more than 20 years of delay, EPA
took a middle-ground approach. The agency announced in
2010 that it would not regulate coal ash as a hazardous waste,
but nonetheless issued comprehensive standards in 2015 gov-
erning the storage and disposal of “coal combustion residuals”
under RCRA’s solid waste provisions. Numerous judicial chal-
lenges to the rule are pending.
Another statute that acts as an indirect check on hazardous
waste generation (and that provides additional incentive to
ensure that one’s waste is safely disposed) is the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA, also known as the federal Superfund law). The
primary focus of this law is the remediation (cleanup) of
hazardous waste contamination resulting from imprudent
handling and disposal practices of the past and the recovery
of remediation costs from those designated as ‘responsible
parties’ under the act. CERCLA imposes liability for the costs
of remediating a hazardous waste site both on the owners
and operators of the site and on those generators of hazardous
waste that sent waste to the site. Because the owners and oper-
ators are often business entities that are no longer ﬁnancially
viable, CERCLA liability often falls most heavily on the gener-
ators. And CERCLA liability is strict liability, meaning that the
exercise of reasonable care by the generator is not a defense.
Further, unless the generator can establish a convincing factual
basis for distinguishing its waste from all or part of the
contamination being remediated, CERCLA liability is joint
and several, meaning that each responsible party is potentially
liable for the full cost of remediation. As a practical matter, this
means that the cost of remediation will be borne by those
among the responsible parties who are ﬁnancially solvent.
The prudent business entity, then, has a strong ﬁnancial
incentive to take such actions as will minimize the likeli-
hood that it will face CERCLA liability in the future. As
the only certain way to avoid such liability is to refrain
from generating the waste in the ﬁrst instance, CERCLA
does provide a rationale for pollution prevention. Further,
it provides ﬁrms with an incentive to meet – or perhaps to
go beyond – RCRA regulations in dealing with such wastes
as they do generate.
This is not to say, of course, that substantial amounts of
hazardous waste are no longer generated in the United States,
that all hazardous wastes are adequately treated and safely
disposed, or that all instances of hazardous waste contamination
are being adequately addressed (or addressed at all). RCRA and
CERCLA both contain what might reasonably be called loop-
holes and gaps in coverage, and hazardous waste contamination
remains an ongoing issue. Further, the most common treatment
methodology incorporated into EPA’s RCRA treatment stan-
dards is incineration, which has brought with it a release of
airborne contaminants that has yet to be comprehensively
addressed by regulation. There is no question, however, that
the country has made considerable progress from the late
1970s, when disposal of chemical wastes in unlined landﬁlls –
at a cost of roughly $15 per ton – was the common practice.
The Chemical Safety Provisions of the Clean Air Act:
Obligations Imposed by EPA and OSHA to Prevent the
Sudden and Accidental Releases of Chemicals
Although the ﬁrst congressional response to the concern gener-
ated by the deadly industrial accident in Bhopal, India, was
the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act
of 1986, the chemical safety provisions of that law are focused
almost solely on mitigation and not on accident prevention. A
much greater potential for a direct focus on accident prevention
can be found in the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act,
although that potential has yet to be realized by EPA and OSHA.
As amended in 1990, Section 112 of the Clean Air Act
directs the EPA to develop regulations regarding the prevention
and detection of accidental chemical releases and to publish
a list of at least 100 chemical substances (with associated
threshold quantities) to be covered by the regulations. The
regulations must include requirements for the development
of risk-management plans (RMPs) by facilities using any of
the regulated substances in amounts above the relevant
threshold. These RMPs must include a hazard assessment, an
accident prevention program, and an emergency release
program. Similarly, Section 304 of the Clean Air Amendments
of 1990 directed OSHA to promulgate a Process Safety Manage-
ment (PSM) standard under the OSHAct.
Section 112(r) of the revised Clean Air Act also imposes
a ‘general duty’ on all “owners and operators of stationary sour-
ces,” regardless of the particular identity or quantity of the
chemicals used on site. These parties have a duty to:
l identify hazards that may result from (accidental chemical)
releases using appropriate hazard assessment techniques,
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l design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are
necessary to prevent releases, and
l minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do
occur.
Thus, ﬁrms are now under a general duty to anticipate,
prevent, and mitigate accidental releases. In deﬁning the nature
of this duty, Section 112(r) speciﬁes that it is “a general duty
in the same manner and to the same extent as” that imposed
by Section 5 of the OSHAct. Because Section 112(r) speciﬁcally
ties its general duty obligation to the general duty clause of the
OSHAct, case law interpreting the OSHAct provision should be
directly relevant. In the 1987 General Dynamics case, the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that OSHA standards
and the general duty obligation are distinct and independent
requirements and that compliance with a standard does not
discharge an employer’s duty to comply with the general duty
obligation. Similarly, compliance with other Clean Air Act chem-
ical safety requirements should not relieve a ﬁrm’s duty to
comply with the act’s general duty clause. Further, the require-
ment that owners and operators ‘design and maintain’ a safe
facility would seem to extend the obligation into the area of
primary prevention, rather than merely hazard control.
The Clean Air Act also requires each state to establish
programs to provide small business with technical assistance
in addressing chemical safety. These programs could provide
information on alternative technologies, process changes,
products, andmethods of operation that help reduce emissions
to air. However, these state mandates are unfunded and may
not be uniformly implemented. Where they are established,
linkage with state ofﬁces of technical assistance, especially
those that provide guidance on pollution prevention, could
be particularly beneﬁcial.
Finally, the 1990 amendments established an independent
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSHIB). The
board is to investigate the causes of accidents, conduct research
on prevention, and make recommendations for preventive
approaches, much like the Air Transportation Safety Board
does with regard to airplane safety.
As required by the 1990 Clean Air Amendments, OSHA
promulgated a workplace Process Safety Management (PSM)
standard in 1992. The PSM standard is designed to protect
employees working in facilities that use ‘highly hazardous
chemicals,’ and employees working in facilities with more
than 10 000 pounds of ﬂammable liquids or gases present in
one location. The list of highly hazardous chemicals in the stan-
dard includes acutely toxic, highly ﬂammable, and reactive
substances. The PSM standard requires employers to compile
safety information (including process ﬂow information) on
chemicals and processes used in the workplace, complete
a workplace process hazard analysis every 5 years, conduct trien-
nial compliance safety audits, develop and implement written
operating procedures, conduct extensive worker training,
develop and implement plans to maintain the integrity of
process equipment, perform prestartup reviews for new (and
signiﬁcantly modiﬁed) facilities, develop and implement
written procedures to manage changes in production methods,
establish an emergency action plan, and investigate accidents
and near-misses at their facilities. Many aspects of chemical
safety are not covered by speciﬁc workplace standards. Most
OSHA standards that do apply to chemical safety have their
origin in the consensus standards adopted under Section 6(a)
of the OSHAct in 1971, and hence are greatly out of date. Argu-
ably, the general duty obligation of the OSHAct imposes
a continuing duty on employers to seek out technological
improvements that would improve safety for workers.
In 1996, the EPA promulgated regulations setting forth
requirements for the RMPs speciﬁed in the Clean Air Act.
The RMP rule is modeled after the OSHA PSM standard and
is estimated to affect some 66 000 facilities. The rule requires
a hazard assessment (involving an offsite consequence
analysis – including worst-case risk scenarios – and compila-
tion of a 5-year accident history), a prevention program to
address the hazards identiﬁed, and an emergency response
program. In 2003, the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investiga-
tion Board urged OSHA to amend its 1996 regulations in order
to achieve more comprehensive control of ‘reactive hazards’
that could have catastrophic consequences and asked OSHA
to deﬁne and record information on reactive chemical inci-
dents that it investigates or is required to investigate. These
recommendations have largely been ignored. The board also
expressed concern that the material safety data sheets (MSDSs)
issued by OSHA do not adequately identify the reactive poten-
tial of chemicals. Legislation is being promoted to require
OSHA to prepare or revise MSDSs for the list of chemicals in
the PSM standard, and to generally strengthen OSHA’s
approach to chemical safety. Despite the fact that a memo-
randum of understanding between EPA and OSHA had been
signed in 1996, in 2001 the U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce
(GAO) issued a report indicating the need for better coordina-
tion between EPA, OSHA, the CSHIB, and other agencies.
Recent catastrophic accidents at reﬁneries and chemical
storage facilities have revived interest not only in the better
control of reactive hazards, but also in the prevention of chem-
ical accidents through the dissemination of information identi-
fying inherently safer technologies (and, possibly, requiring
their adoption by problematic facilities). While the administra-
tions of Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush largely
failed to embrace the potential opportunities for fundamental
change offered by inherent safety, the administration of
President Barack Obama has been more receptive. In 2013,
President Obama issued an executive order to improve safety
and security at chemical plants, and he issued another executive
order in 2015 requiring federal agencies to achieve certain
sustainability criteria.
Environmental Regulation in the European Union
Europe, once behind the United States in environmental legisla-
tion, now often surpasses the United States in its environmental
initiatives. European Union directives form an overarching regu-
latory structure under which individual member states imple-
ment the broad general requirements of the directives. The
most recent examples are the Water Framework Directive and
the REACH (Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of
Chemicals) system, focused on improving the production and
assessment of risk information and regulation of industrial
chemicals, the counterpart to TSCA in the United States. Recent
discussions leading to a trade agreement between the US and the
516 Environmental Protection Laws
European Union have highlighted the advantages that could be
achieved through international coordination of environmental
and product safety legislation and practices, especially concern-
ing TSCA and REACH.
See also: Arsenic; Asbestos; Bioaerosols; Carcinogens,
Environmental; Environmental Health: Overview; Hazardous
Wastes; Human Exposure Science; Mercury; Outdoor Air
Pollution: Sources, Atmospheric Transport, and Human Health
Effects.
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